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The movement to understand the nature of Unconventional Warfare through the lens of Special Movement Theory is a continuing
effort.  Since the article “A Social Movement Approach to UW” appeared in Special Warfare Magazine, last year, the concept has
received a healthy dose of positive and critical feedback.[i] While the uprisings during the Arab Spring demonstrated the enduring
utility of civil unrest in bringing about political change, the crisis in Ukraine forced us to sharpen our understanding of how to fuse
civil unrest with unconventional warfare. Earlier this year, looking for ways to understand the contemporary threats and challenges,
SOCOM FMD asked a series of questions about how to operationalize the social movement approach. In this article, we will attempt
to answer those questions and share some insight of this approach which can provide a framework of how to leverage existing
opposition movements in support of an unconventional warfare (UW) campaign.
Why Leverage Social Movements?
In order to better understand how to leverage organic social movements we must first determine why they are relevant in the
contemporary operational environment.  Conflicts in recent years can be characterized by four overall patterns. The first pattern is
wars have become increasingly transnational with more states working with or through non-state actors against other states.[ii]
State actors increasingly take advantage of internal conflicts in another country. For instance, 176 cases of sponsored irregular
conflicts that lasted at least 2 years are observed between 1946 and 2001.[iii] The second pattern is internal conflicts are becoming
more protracted with fewer and fewer of them coming to an end quickly.[iv] While the overall number of civil wars has decreased
since the end of the Cold War, the ratio between war protraction and war termination is growing large.[v] Third pattern is insurgent
movements are increasingly more likely to win than before. In his 2013 book "Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla
Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present" Max Boot, one of America's leading military historians and foreign-policy analysts,
explains that the increase success rate of insurgents is directly attributed to the rise of politics, propaganda, and public opinion in
warfare.[vi] Simply put, war itself has become more about controlling perceived legitimacy, politics and public support, than just
inflicting damage on the opponent. Thus, insurgents can compensate their typical force inferiority with cost-effective propaganda
operations to increase their chances of winning. Pattern Four is non-military tactics are becoming more effective and pervasive in
conflicts. In their 2012 book “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict” authors Erica Chenoweth
and Maria Stephan point out that since 1945 movements employing civil unrest or civil resistance have been more successful at
achieving their objectives.[vii] In addition, civil resistance campaigns are far less likely to experience protracted instability when
achieving their objectives whereas predominantly armed conflicts are more frequently associated with violent civil wars. Why
insurgent movements are more likely to win and why internal conflicts are becoming more transnational and protracted is subject to
great debate. Some cite the rise of information technology such as social media. Others highlight the rise of transnational actors
affecting domestic conflicts.
What is not disputable are the emerging trends of conflict. Which raises the question, “what do these trends tell us about
unconventional warfare?” In order to increase the likelihood of success in a UW campaign, the sponsor should be cognizant and take
advantage of the emerging patterns of warfare. In particular, patterns three and four, described above, should be highly relevant to
the sponsor. The sponsor should look for existing, organic opposition movements capable of using both nonviolent and violent
tactics to maximize popular support in their struggle against authorities. In other words, strategically a UW campaign should look to
capitalize on, co-opt and incorporate existing opposition groups and networks, if available, and if possible, organize them into a
larger opposition movement.
What is a Social Movement Approach to UW?
It should be made clear that in this context the word “approach” actually refers to how we view UW not in how we do UW. This
distinction is important because social movement theory (SMT) applies to UW if we choose to “approach” it that way or not. Put
differently, SMT is a set of tools that allows planners and commanders a way to understand and influence the environment that
fosters and develops resistance movements. These tools can be used independently or in conjunction with other frameworks and
methods. In essence, the social movement approach to UW can be characterized as leveraging and co-opting existing organic
movements in order to influence strategic outcomes, be that coercion, disruption, or regime change.
There are three key benefits of adding SMT to the concept of UW
1. Theoretically, SMT provides a comprehensive framework not only on why resistance and revolutionary movements happen
but also on how to best leverage existing organic moments regardless of their level of development or maturity. This adds
context to the current definition of UW which does not focus on specifically on how resistance movements and insurgencies
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form and the processes through which they become sustainable in the long run.[viii]
2. Pragmatically, the SMT method is well established within the academic area as a method to identify and explain what
insurgent groups do in order to sustain themselves within the population. This issue becomes critical if we are discussing
sustainable long-term UW campaigns. SMT can provide a slew of TTPs that can help us find and manage an indigenous
movement that is internally sustainable. For instance, the Solidarity Movement in the 80s proved to be highly effective as it had
its own system of collecting and redistributing union dues.[ix] Its close ties with the Catholic Church also enabled the
movement to sustain itself despite aggressive resource control measures employed by the Polish communist regime. Due to the
movement’s ability to sustain itself organically, the U.S. sponsorship could remain unseen. Conversely, the U.S. had to build an
extensive logistical infrastructure to sustain the contras in Nicaragua that relied almost exclusively on the sponsor for material
support. Airfields had to be built and operated to support huge logistical operations. Such operations carry a hefty political cost
and allow for the sponsor to be easily exposed. The well-known and highly politicized Contra scandal was in part initiated only
after the discovery of an airfield used to airdrop supplies to the insurgents.[x] Exposed sponsorship typically robs the
sponsored movements political legitimacy as it is easily tainted by the target regime as a puppet of an external power. In short,
organic sustainment can greatly reduce the visibility of the sponsor. History suggests armed groups who rely on external
material support rarely sustain themselves while garnering popular support.
3. Ideologically, by leveraging and co-opting an organic movement the campaign will appear more indigenous and legitimate
reducing potential propaganda against the external sponsor. In sum, the social movement approach will guide the planner to
look for an indigenous movement that is most likely to align its objectives with our strategic interests. To paraphrase noted UW
expert retired SF Colonel David Maxwell, when UW campaigns are planned and executed by leveraging organic movements,
SOF will be able to implement “slow and deliberate employment – long duration actions and activities, relationship
establishment, development, and sustainment.”[xi]
Is the Social Movement Approach Different from Existing Approaches to UW?
Again, we want to emphasize that SMT is not a new approach. In fact, this approach has been used in numerous historical UW
campaigns executed by the U.S. In many cases the extent to which the sponsor leverage’s organic movements in a UW campaign,
versus artificial, synthetic ones, has a direct and enduring impact on the long-term strategic consequences of the campaign.
So while not different, the social movement approach does underscore a set of particular variables relevant to unconventional
warfare.
1. It focuses on the primacy of local mobilization.
2. It focuses on the long-term sustainability of a movement as a form of strategic influence.
3. It focuses on operational flexibility ranging from nonviolent civil resistance to armed methods.
4. It focuses on four factors promoting sustainable movements: influencing socioeconomic processes, creating political
opportunities by exploiting elite fractures, indigenous networks, and insurgent narrative.
Historically, the lack of surrogate networks developed in the steady state has often led to develop surrogate assets quickly without a
thorough vetting process or examination of their ability to transition into a viable government. As a result, the solution was to look
for cohesive groups with the most kinetic capabilities such as military groups or armed insurgents. While this approach has had
limited success through the employment phase, it is in the last phase of UW, transition, where this creates issues as these groups
traditionally have little to no experience in governance. Consequently, the United States suffered a great deal of ideological deficits
by backing military juntas that often relied on excessive repression for political survival. While operationally successful, these UW
campaigns for the most part did not afford sufficient long-term influence over the respective population. An example of this is the
UW campaign to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 called Operation TPAJAX. Beautifully executed
by a small group of former OSS members, it entailed sponsored agitation, sabotage, disruption, black and white propaganda, a failed
coup, and ultimately a successful coup. At the end of the employment phase a friendly regime was installed by ousting Mossadeq.
While successful in the short term, the lack of an organic movement behind the overthrow created, in part, an enduring hostility
towards the U.S. in one of the most strategically important countries in the region. Another UW campaign to overthrow
democratically elected Guatemala President Jacobo Árbenz called PBSUCCESS ended in similarly negative long-term consequences.
It relied on armed groups trained outside Guatemala, propaganda and kinetic violence to force the democratically elected President
Jacobo Árbenz to resign. The success of the campaign was followed by a 26 year-long civil war where both sides committed atrocities
against the population.[xii] While both of these examples are cases of successful UW campaigns, strategically the lack of an organic
sponsored movement in the transition led to long-term failures.
While the natural default has been to approach UW by supporting armed insurgent groups or there is there an alternative way to
think about UW. If we model how the U.S. supported the Solidarity Movement in Poland in the 80s, the whole campaign had a
longer strategic outlook. In part its success was due to the operation being nested within the larger strategic conflict between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union. It was designed to disrupt Soviet influence in the Eastern Bloc.[xiii] In addition, the sponsored
movement was deeply embedded and connected within a larger opposition network. [xiv] Arguably, both TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS
were ostensibly framed as anti-communist campaigns as well. However, that message never carried much validity with the
population of Iran or Guatemala. Whereas in Poland, our strategic objective of anticommunism containment was in essence aligned
within the local movement’s narrative of political reform. Also, because Poland was largely an area operationally denied to the U.S.,
we had to rely on an organic movement. In addition, because we supported a movement that was already socially embedded and
exercising self-governance, Solidarity was able to engineer a nonviolent and institutional transition into a democratic Poland. After
the transition, the U.S. continued to provide aid. Now, if you think about where Poland stands in terms of our allies in the region,
this is not a trivial matter. On the other hand, and more importantly, social movements are better suited to meet the full spectrum of
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objectives set by the current definition of UW: disruption, coercion, and regime change. Whereas historical approaches to UW
tended to focus on only regime change, today’s focus should be on planning and executing UW campaigns that can achieve
disruption and coercion. After all, if we break a country, then we are likely to have to own it. Also, coercion and disruption do not
carry as hefty a political price as regime change. It is hard to imagine how a sponsor could exercise enduring strategic influence
through and by a surrogate general or armed group only. If you think about Hezbollah in the context of UW as an insurgent
movement sponsored by the IRGC, then the strategic utility of the social movement approach becomes quite self-evident. In essence,
Hezbollah is a sponsored social and radical movement that has exercised the IRGC’s strategic influence in a foreign country for over
three decades.[xv]
Are Social Movements Important in Fomenting Regime Change?
While mobilizing mass movements is one “method” of “regime change” that enjoys recent popularity especially thanks to the Arab
Spring. It should be noted that it is only one method. Utilizing organic social movements should not be limited as a set of tools to
achieve the strategic end state of overthrowing a government. The true utility of understanding how to use social movements lies in
their ability to achieve the other two doctrinal goals of UW: to disrupt and especially to coerce. Politically speaking, coercion and
disruption will likely be more acceptable use as U.S. policy for decision makers in the future. As we explore these other two areas in
more detail we open a much broader vision of the strategic utility of UW and how to capitalize on these existing social movements.
There is vast amount of empirical evidence that supports the use of SMT tools to disrupt and coerce. The extensive literature on civil
resistance and social movements indicate that flexible movements that use limited violence surgically and strategically are twice as
likely to achieve their objectives as violent campaigns.[xvi] In the majority of regime change campaigns, the extent of popular
support the social movement enjoys for sustainability and durability is proportional to how legitimate it is perceived by the
population. By using violence defensively and surgically, the social movement can easily appear more righteous than the regime and
thus harness more popular support in the long run. In addition, successful regime change campaigns that primarily relied on
nonviolent social movements are twice as unlikely to experience post-transition instability as successful violent campaigns. Violent
regime change campaigns often result in protracted disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation processes. Groups that are not
entirely satisfied with the political outcome of regime change can easily use armed methods to spoil the transition phase. UW at the
strategic level must avoid this type of post-transition instability; unless, protracted instability is the objective.
How Do We Better Prepare SOF for Future UW Campaigns?
The social movement approach is composed of four lines of effort:
1. Deepen broad socioeconomic grievances,
2. Open political opportunities by exploiting elite fractures or supporting indigenous dissident leaders,
3. Enhance indigenous organizational effectiveness,
4. Focus on expanding insurgent narratives.
In order for the social movement framework to work, planners must assess and analyze these as part of UW campaign development.
In practice, this process should begin with mapping the human domain in strategically important regions and countries. Such
mapping will enable the campaign designers to understand how to identify and exploit elite fractures, understand strategic network
dynamics in order to identify and co-opt a self-sustaining movement and understand how to align our objectives with indigenous
narratives. This mapping should begin in the steady state with continuous updates.  In order to accomplish this monumental task
any and all opportunities should be taken advantage of in order to gain a higher level of map detail. The U.S. has personnel
interacting with indigenous elements throughout the world on a continual basis.  These U.S. military, intelligence, diplomatic, and
development entities have unremitting insight and updated knowledge of the local organic networks and personnel.  As part of their
daily tasks, these elements should be required to map out and update the relationships and connections of the individuals and
networks that they interact with and have knowledge of.  This information is more than enhancing it is necessary to planning and
executing a social movement driven UW campaign.  These human domain maps will aid in identifying the strategic networks within
the opposition movements capable of maximizing popular support in their struggle against authorities. 
What are Important Capabilities that We Should Develop to Mobilize Resistance Movements?
First, it should be noted that full mobilization is not always necessary especially in the steady state environment. Premature
mobilization can unnecessarily trigger the exposure of the sponsor. Leading up to the employment phase, perhaps it is best that the
sponsor align its objectives with compatible movements in a discrete fashion in order to minimize detection by the target regime.
Second, whoever is responsible for the UW campaign development (DOD, CIA, DOS, etc.) should look at what they are trying to
accomplish separate from what any existing organic movements are trying to accomplish and understand how to best merge
the two in order to produce a desired end state. The goal should not be to simply “mobilize” a movement. Rather to mobilize
it to the U.S. goal which may or may not align with the movements.
In terms of developing an infrastructure that can help facilitate a UW campaign USSOCOMs move to create a “Global SOF network”
is a step in the right direction. Such a network should initially focus on building the connections and capturing the relationships in
order to build the maps of the Human Domain especially in “hot” spots where possible contingencies are expected.  This mapping
effort should focus on the relational connections between people, groups, and organizations.  Once this relational data has been
gathered then analysts can use social network analysis (SNA) metrics that can enrich the understanding of how organic movements
organizing themselves and can offer potential strategies including SMT to influence the environment that fosters and supports
possible future UW campaigns.
Theater Special Operations Commands should assign ownership of Human Terrain Mapping to a specific section to be managed and
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tracked. These sections or cells should be synchronized with all deployed element within the country or region in order to
continuously update the information building the maps. Just like we would never go to war without detailed physical maps, we
should not assume we can conduct UW campaigns without detailed maps of the human terrain.  USSOCOM should develop a
knowledge management system for detailed maps of elite fractures, social groups, opposition networks, organic movements,
and locally resonating narratives. Particular attention should be paid to crisis moments such as contested elections or civil wars in
order to identify existing opposition movements and leaders. Typically, dissidents or activists become more visible to outsiders when
political control is relaxed due to a political or social crisis. For instance, we were able to see the internal composition of the Green
Movement in 2009 when mass demonstrations broke out to protest the fraudulent results of the Iranian presidential elections. 
Learning from Strategic Competitors
Warfare is becoming increasingly more transnational, protracted, and fused with civilians and nonmilitary methods. UW must take
advantage of these patterns. Unfortunately, it appears that our strategic competitors are ahead of us in terms of integrating their
strategic doctrine with the same patterns. Take Russia for example. General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the
Russian armed forces published a thought-provoking article titled “The New Generation Warfare” in one of the premier Russian
military journals in February 2013.[xvii]
Gerasimov highlights the importance of understanding the landscape of warfare and four characteristics that Russia should
incorporate in grand strategy. First, the trend of the 21st century blurs the line between war and peace. Second, the role and
effectiveness of civil and non-military methods of achieving political and strategic goals in some cases has far exceeded those of the
force of arms. Third, the method of strategic confrontation has shifted from purely military means toward widespread use of
political, economic, information, humanitarian, and non-military measures taking advantage of protest potential of the population.
Fourth, leveraging civil unrest is complemented by covert military measure including information warfare and activities conducted
by special operations forces. It seems that these assessments are the mirror image of the four emerging trends of conflict we
observed earlier.
Following these assessments, Gerasimov proposes a model of what we would ostensibly call UW. The model begins with formation of
opposition movements and civil unrest supported by military measures to prevent outright repression on the sponsored unarmed
opposition. Ironically, the Russian UW model underscores the strategic utility of civil resistance elements in order to establish
political justification. Of importance is the overall political and social nature of the initial phase. Then it prescribes initiation of
“conflict actions” followed by utilization of economic, political, and diplomatic measures to deepen the crisis. Figure 1 depicts
Gerasimov’s model. The crisis moment then justifies external intervention including combat actions.  Interestingly, nonlethal aid is
used to establish the perception of defensive military intervention. In other words, when economic or humanitarian aid is denied by
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the enemy state to the sponsored movement, then Russia can exploit the situation to deepen its military intervention to support the
relief efforts. Also note the pervasive and extensive use of information warfare to control the perception of Russian sponsorship.
These dynamics were clearly visible in Eastern Ukraine.[xviii] It is clear that what has happened in Crimean and Eastern Ukraine
consistently followed the model. In other words, it seems that the new doctrine is in full effect.
What can we learn from the Ukraine crisis?  The main lesson is how civil resistance, how social movements are integrated within
Russian UW doctrine. Their campaign began with the formation of viable pro-Russian strategic networks, highlighting the
importance of mapping and identifying opposition movements and political factures points within strategically important countries
and areas. It should be noted that the doctrine itself emphasizes the importance of large opposition strategic networks
supported by smaller covert operational networks developed by special operations forces. Simply put, setting the
conditions for acceptance of sponsorship to a resistance or insurgent movement must begin with understanding the existing organic
strategic networks followed by the development of operational networks to access and influence them in the steady state. While
some question if mapping of resistance or insurgent networks is operationally realistic, the CORE lab within the Defense Analysis
Department at the Naval Postgraduate School has been pioneering visualization and social network analysis methods to identify and
assess both insurgent and opposition movement networks for the last several years. Analysts in the lab have been operationally tied
with several Department of Defense and law enforcement entities to provide a better awareness of the operational environment
centered on the Human Domain. The capabilities exist, within the SOF community, to take advantage of the emerging importance of
social movements and human/social networks in support of future operations. The recent trends in the threats and challenges to the
U.S. underscores why the U.S. must increase its capacity to leverage existing social and political movements and expand the lens of
UW to incorporate SMT and SNA approaches. Although they may use different terms, other major powers are already aggressively
utilizing these same social movement tools to influence and control the Human Domain and achieve their national policy objectives.
As we find ourselves challenged by multiply threats in multiple conflicts across this new paradigm we cannot afford to lag behind.
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Repression doesn't always lead to demobilization. Bob Helvey shows that successful social movements often coopt or convert
security forces to rob the state of its ability to crush protesters. Think about the overthrow of Slobodan Milo!evi! in 2000 or the
Philippines in 1986. In both cases, the regime tried to use its security forces to destroy the movements, but failed. in This does not
mean that SMT would always work. The SM approach is about leveraging resistance elements if they already exist.
But are we talking about SMT theory in the environment of oppressive Govts. that fall over dead when confronted by a mass
demonstrations (when the State bureaucracies - Security Police, military wait for the State to decide to repress or procrastinate)
and join the people like the Soviet-era Governments falling?
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